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Comparing the Dynamics of Party Leadership Survival in 
Britain and Australia: Brown, Rudd and Gillard  
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the interaction between the respective party structures of the Australian 
Labor Party and the British Labour Party as a means of assessing the strategic options 
facing aspiring challengers for the party leadership. Noting the relative neglect within the 
scholarly literature on examining forced exits that occur; and attempted forced exits that do 
not occur, this article takes as its case study the successful forced exits of Kevin Rudd and 
Julia Gillard, and the failure to remove Gordon Brown. In doing so the article challenges the 
prevailing assumption that the likely success of leadership evictions are solely determined by 
the leadership procedures that parties adopt. Noting the significance of circumstances and 
party cultures, the article advances two scenarios through which eviction attempts can be 
understood: first, forced exits triggered through the activation of formal procedures (Rudd 
and Gillard); second, attempts to force an exit by informal pressures outside of the formal 
procedures which are overcome by the incumbent (Brown).  
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One of the most intriguing aspects of organisational change within political parties has been 
the trend towards democratisation with regard to the selection of the leader. Whilst this 
should enhance the accountability of the leader to the wider party it has been argued that the 
process of democratisation diffuses power and makes it harder to hold incumbents to account 
and makes them more difficult to replace (Weller 2012). This is an argument that has been 
made most notably about the British Labour Party (Quinn 2012). The dynamics of leadership 
survival or eviction have been considerably different within the Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
where such processes of democratisation had not, until recently, been undertaken (‘t Hart and 
Uhr 2011; Cross and Blais 2012). Such democratisation was put on the agenda when Kevin 
Rudd announced a set of ALP reform proposals in July 2013 (Gauja 2013). The differences 
between the two parties in terms of their organisational arrangements regarding the party 
leadership (prior to the Rudd reforms) make for an interesting comparison. And for scholars 
of party organisation it provides a dilemma: how and why were Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard 
removed from the leadership of the Australian Labor Party, and how and why was Gordon 
Brown not removed from the leadership of the British Labour Party?  
 
Weller draws a clear distinction between the structural apparatus of the institutional 
arrangements that parties use and the strategic choices that then face aspiring leaders. The 
dynamics of Australian party politics have traditionally demanded that aspiring leaders have 
to ‘fight’ – flexible procedures means that challengers can ‘seize the job by political force’ 
and ‘eject the incumbent in a direct confrontation’ (Weller 2012: 154). The strategic options 
to aspiring Labour party leaders are reduced by the impact of the Electoral College system 
that serves to inhibit challengers and protect incumbents. Using Brown as his example 
(between 1997 and 2007), Weller argues that such aspirants are left to ‘fulminate’. His 
description of how hypothetical challengers have to wait ‘grumbling, complaining [and] 
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agonising at the unwarranted delay’ would resonate with many New Labour parliamentarians 
(Weller 2012: 154).  
 
Weller concludes that whilst Australian prime ministers (from both Labor and Liberal parties) 
are ‘dogs on a very short leash’, aspiring Labour prime ministers have ‘no opportunity to 
wield the knife’ (Weller 2012: 154, 157). Does this claim explain the differences between 
Rudd and Gillard on the one hand and Brown on the other? Weller, himself, does not address 
Brown’s survival against this distinction, preferring to focus in on the survival of Blair and 
the impotence of Brown in the face of the procedural hurdles. This article assesses whether 
structural factors alone explain all, or whether, as Walter (2013) has emphasised, wider 
circumstances relating to the agency of incumbents, leadership aspirants, and timing in the 
electoral cycle and governing duration also need consideration. Following reforms, initiated 
by Rudd, to the selection mechanism for the Australian Labor Party leader and now bedding 
down, we present a cautionary tale to the ALP in that structural changes alone do not 
immediately lead to a change in party culture. 
 
Electing and Ejecting the Party Leader 
 
The focus of the literature on leadership successions tends to be on single country cases and 
is dominated by three countries with similar polities – Britain, Australia and Canada, whose 
‘governing principles derived from similar constitutional assumptions’ (Weller 2012: 152).  
There are notable exceptions, many stressing the importance of contingent contextual factors 
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and comparative analysis (such as Weller 1994; Davis 1998; Bynander and ‘t Hart 2007, 
2008;  Kenig 2009; ‘t Hart and Uhr 2011; Cross and Blais 2012; and Walter 2013).  
 
Within the single country based literature there is considerably more material assessing 
leadership successions within British political parties, providing a rich analytical basis for our 
two-country comparison.  Scholars have developed their work around the following themes. 
First, there is work that appraises individual contests to examine the quality of candidates and 
the significance of the campaigning period (e.g. Alderman and Carter 1991, 1993, 1995; 
Alderman 1996, 1998; Denham and O’Hara 2008; Dorey and Denham 2006, 2011; Heppell 
2008, 2010). Second, there is work that seeks to examine the variables that may have 
influenced voting behaviour at the level of the parliamentary party (e.g. Cowley and Garry 
1998; Cowley and Bailey 2000; Heppell and Hill 2008, 2009, 2010). Third, there has been a 
focus on the significance of amending the party leadership selection rules, or the continuing 
merits or otherwise of existing procedures (e.g. Stark 1996; Quinn 2004, 2005, 2012). Fourth, 
there has been work that analyses the ease, or otherwise, with which incumbents can be 
removed from the party leadership (e.g. Alderman and Smith 1990; McAnulla 2010). What 
the above appraisal demonstrates is the dominant focus has been on elections, whether for 
vacancies (the majority of cases) or challenges which have been successful. The academic 
analysis of when party leaders survive, despite considerable questioning of their leadership, is 
thus the under-developed aspect of leadership selection studies.  
 
The Non Removal of Gordon Brown   
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What made Brown vulnerable to eviction? Some of his critics, such as Charles Clarke and 
Frank Field, would claim that Brown lacked legitimacy flowing from the way in which he 
had acquired the Labour Party leadership in May 2007 (Quinn 2012: 88). Brown had been 
elected unopposed as his only possible rival for the leadership, John McDonnell failed to 
secure the requisite number of parliamentary backers to initiate the Electoral College. 
However, as Brown defeated McDonnell by 313 to 29 nominations (McDonnell needed 44 to 
pass the nomination threshold or 12.5 per cent of the PLP), the argument that he lacked 
legitimacy at PLP level is erroneous. His legitimacy only came into question as his authority 
was undermined by his poor performance as prime minister (Foley 2009).  
 
Brown’s deficiencies provoked limited sympathy within his own party. This was partly due to 
the reputation that he had acquired during the years waiting for Blair to step down. His fears 
about an alternative to himself emerging had contributed to him developing a reputation as a 
‘scheming fixer’ and ‘petty infighter’ (Hughes 2010: 3). Labour had experienced an upsurge 
in poll ratings in the first few months of Brown’s prime ministerial tenure and there appeared 
an opportunity to enhance his leadership legitimacy. With this chance to secure his own 
mandate to lead, expectations that Brown may call a snap general election were allowed to 
develop Rawnsley 2010: 496-515). When a Conservative recovery in the opinion polls 
emerged, Brown chose not to dissolve Parliament, but tried to claim that his decision was not 
influenced by the opinion polls. Brown’s credibility never recovered from the election that 
never was in the autumn of 2007 (Foley 2009: 500).  
 
The cumulative impact of these factors contributed to a series of plots being initiated to 
remove Brown from the leadership, and as the speculation about possible challenges 
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intensified, so did Brown’s ‘hyper-sensitivity to potential rivals’ (Kenny 2009a: 503). The 
speculation disfigured Labour Party politics between mid 2008 and around January 2010. 
There were three substantive plots against him, which were interpreted by political 
commentators as preludes to the removal of Brown. These occurred in July 2008; June 2009 
and January 2010. The first rumoured plot involved the Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, 
whose advisors decided to make a ‘significant intervention’ (Hasan and MacIntyre 2011: 
139). Miliband’s Guardian article ostensibly did nothing more than outline what Labour 
needed to do to reconnect with the electorate, but his failure to mention Brown by name, was 
interpreted as indicating his willingness to be an alternative leader of the party(Hasan and 
MacIntyre 2011: 140).  
 
The second substantive plot presented a more serious threat to Brown. The dual impact of the 
fallout of the expenses scandal and poor local and European parliamentary election results, 
led to a series of ministerial resignations. The expenses scandal forced two cabinet ministers - 
Jacqui Smith and Hazel Blears – to resign, and Caroline Flint resigned claiming that Brown 
ran a two tier administration that marginalised female ministers. Of greater significance, 
however, was the resignation from cabinet of James Purnell. His resignation letter, which 
claimed that Brown continuing as prime minister made a Conservative victory ‘more, not less 
likely’, ended with the request that Brown ‘stand aside to give our party a fighting chance of 
winning’ (Quinn 2012: 89). Press speculation now focused on whether other Cabinet 
ministers would resign, thus assuming that Brown would depart voluntarily if they did, 
without a formal challenge being needed. However, with senior Cabinet figures, such as 
Harriet Harman, Jack Straw and critically, Peter Mandelson rallying behind Brown, the most 
likely beneficiary of this plot, David Miliband, decided not to resign, and thus Brown 
survived (Quinn 2012: 89).  
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One final attempted putsch was initiated in January 2010 and was co-ordinated by former 
cabinet ministers, Geoff Hoon and Patricia Hewitt. A letter was circulated amongst Labour 
MPs demanding a vote of confidence in Brown. This request contravened the constitution of 
the party, which had no provision for confidence motions regarding the party leader. The 
intention was to attempt to circumnavigate the procedures by initiating a ‘frontbench coup’. 
Cabinet members dissatisfied with Brown remained out of sight and did not answer their 
telephones in the aftermath of the circulation of the letter. The impact of their reluctance to 
publicly endorse him would force Brown into resigning given that the cabinet were no longer 
backing him (Quinn 2012: 90). However, as the hours passed and Harman and Straw backed 
off from asking for Brown’s resignation, (which was supposedly part of the plan), so cabinet 
ministers gradually began to offer their support. David Miliband, who had been ‘waiting to 
see what happened’, eventually stood outside the Foreign Office and announced he was 
‘getting on with his job’ (Hasan and MacIntyre 2011: 169).  
 
The Removal of Kevin Rudd 
 
Kevin Rudd’s removal can be seen as a consequence of deep personal flaws and institutional 
pressure. One simple answer as to why the ALP ousted Rudd is that they had the institutional 
capability to remove the leader and were willing to use this collective caucus power. Since 
1945 in Australia there have been several challenges to the sitting prime minister in the party 
room. Liberal prime minister John Gorton was challenged shortly after winning the 1969 
election and again in 1971, when famously a tied vote saw him casting the deciding vote 
against himself. Andrew Peacock failed to unseat Liberal prime minister Malcolm Fraser in 
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1981. Under Labor, Bob Hawke managed to see off Paul Keating’s first party room challenge 
in 1991, but after a destabilising six month backbench campaign from Keating, lost the prime 
ministership. Evaluations of the first short lived Rudd period of office and its dramatic end 
divide between the personal (Stuart 2010; Marr 2010, Jackman 2008, Megalogonis 2010, 
2012) and weightier structural analyses (Evans 2010; Walter 2011; Rhodes and Tiernan 
2013). 
 
Rudd had arrived in Canberra in 1998, determined to make his way to the top of the Labor 
party. His political experience was honed as Chief of Staff under Queensland Premier Wayne 
Goss. He had a singular desire to lead the federal party and ‘He didn’t hide his ambitions’ 
(Marr 2010: 40). Rudd though had to bide his time as Labor went through a succession of 
leaders in opposition. While the Liberal National Coalition of John Howard remained in 
power, Labor tried first Kim Beazley, then Simon Crean, Mark Latham and Beazley once 
again. It was Crean who made Rudd foreign affairs spokesman and he subsequently 
established a more public persona, becoming a serious challenger for the leadership by 2003. 
Although his popularity grew with the public, he struggled to muster enough support in 
caucus (a recurring refrain in the Rudd story) to formally stand in 2003 and 2005. Hanging on 
to his foreign affairs brief he was well placed to capitalise on the Australian Wheat Board 
scandal that broke in 2006 over kickbacks paid to the Iraqi regime. Rudd mounted a most 
effective attack on the government, simultaneously presenting Howard as a manipulator of 
the truth and himself as a professional, diligent politician acting with integrity. Rudd stepped 
up to challenge Beazley and became Labor leader on 4 December 2006, winning the backing 
of the Labor caucus by 49 to 39 votes, but only when Julia Gillard and her supporters 
accepted that Rudd though less popular in caucus was polling better as the alternative to 
Beazley. 
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Rudd initially took to the leadership with gusto. As John Howard’s own leadership creaked 
and strained, the focus shifted from Labor’s leadership troubles onto the government. In 
particular, Howard’s own position as leader in advance of the 2007 election came under 
much greater scrutiny. When battle was joined in earnest in October 2007, Rudd ran an 
overtly ‘presidentialised’ campaign based on ‘new leadership’ for Australia (Wanna 2008; 
Van Onselen 2010). A slick campaign largely based around the Rudd brand as Kevin07, saw 
Labor gain a 16 seat majority (Stuart 2010; Jackman 2008). Although not an overwhelming 
electoral endorsement, with Howard dramatically losing his seat, it was a victory that Labor 
could savour after so long in the wilderness. The euphoria of a return of a Labor government, 
led seemingly by an intellectual man of conviction, proved short lived. Rudd, the Mandarin 
speaking former diplomat, was ushered in as a ‘man for all seasons’, a ‘geek’ who would 
appeal to broad range of Australians. He presented a cautious and conservative form of 
leadership reaching out to the median-voter in a highly personalised campaign. His early 
activism as prime minister, signing the Kyoto Protocol on his first day in office and 
delivering an apology to the stolen generations on the first day of parliament, appeared a 
promising start. By early 2010 it had all turned sour. 
 
A range of factors coalesced to turn the opinion polls against the Rudd led government. The 
opposition (not immune itself to leadership turnover) managed to unite behind the right-wing 
Tony Abbott, after Brendon Nelson and Malcolm Turnbull had brief stints as Liberal party 
leaders, and started to make a dent in Rudd’s personal popularity rating. The Rudd 
Government were hit by a succession of policy failures, U-turns and over-promises (many 
derived from the grand 2020 summit championed and led by Rudd in April 2008). The most 
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damaging policy reversal proved to be the decision to dump Labor’s commitment to the 
launch of an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) by 2011. As several have reflected (Van 
Onselen 2010; Evans 2010), Rudd’s problems really began to kick in from this point. Having 
made climate change the centrepiece of his 2007 campaign and initial premiership as ‘the 
great moral issue of our time’, to then drop the flagship commitment dealt a severe personal 
and collective blow to Rudd and Labor. In addition to the debacle of the ETS, Evans lists six 
other policy failures (refugees, home insulation, primary schools building project, child care, 
Northern Territory intervention, mining super tax) that ‘alienated the electorate and, most 
significantly, radicalised opposition within his own party’ (Evans 2010: 272). 
 
Rudd also faced a growing backlash against his style of governing (Tiernan 2008; Strangio 
2013). The critique of Rudd’s style of management centres on the impact of a dysfunctional 
leader on the various aspects of prime ministerial power. Rudd failed to work with and 
through his cabinet (Marr 2010; Evans 2010). Decisions were concentrated in a ‘gang of 
four’ of Rudd, Treasurer Wayne Swann, Lindsay Tanner and Julia Gillard. Despite early 
policy successes the signs were there that Rudd may be storing up trouble. He ran his affairs 
at a break neck pace, insider comments such as ‘it is impossible to exaggerate the degree of 
personal intervention by the prime minister. It’s his personality’, became commonplace 
(Tiernan 2008). His insistence on personal control across the full spectrum of the 
government’s policy and media management put a huge strain on his staff and inevitably led 
to a backlash against such micromanagement. 
 
A constant link is made between the policy failures, dysfunctional governing style and 
Rudd’s apparently flawed personality and fitness to lead. The impact of his personality was 
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such that policies were never followed through to conclusion, left in limbo, U-turns 
performed and government mired in indecision and failure. The slide in the polls created 
alarm, but it was Rudd who had brought this on himself. Yet it is impossible to assess the 
removal of Rudd without analysing the factional cleavages that any leader of the ALP must 
take heed of in order to survive (Davis 2011; Gauja 2011; Leigh 2000; Warhurst and Parkin 
2000).The ability to hold the support of the parliamentary party is crucial to remaining in 
power (Bennister 2007, 2008, 2012), even more so with a parliamentary caucus of 115 in the 
ALP. 
 
In early May 2010, with an election due later in the year, the consequences of the downturn 
in the Labor government’s fortunes hit party strategists. The party’s primary vote had 
slumped to 35 per cent and Rudd’s own approval rating fell into negative territory for the first 
time (Stuart 2010). Rudd had generated this autonomous relationship with the public to reach 
beyond the party factions, but it left him vulnerable when the polls fell in such a dramatic 
fashion (even allowing for an electoral cycle depressing support for the incumbent 
government in the winter months). ALP ‘machine politics’ kicked in and the powerbrokers 
began to think the unthinkable: replacing a sitting prime minister his first term of office (Kent 
2010: 313). The window of opportunity meant that any challenge had to be concluded 
successfully by 24 June, the last parliamentary sitting day of the term. MPs would break for 
winter and caucus would be dispersed after this date. Any earlier move and the new prime 
minister would be swiftly exposed to the opposition. As Julia Gillard was the only credible 
alternative to Rudd, it was hoped she would benefit from a political honeymoon over the 
winter before the polls picked up in spring, leading to the sunny uplands of the impending 
general election. 
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The plotters, none of whom were household names, quickly became dubbed the faceless men 
in the subsequent accounts of the ejection. Such labelling further damaged the ALP, harking 
back to the notorious case of the 36 ‘faceless men’ deciding ALP policy in 1963 while the 
leader waited outside the conference hall (Warhurst and Parkin 2000). The key individuals 
were Bill Shorten, parliamentary secretary for disability and children’s services, but more 
importantly former secretary of the Australian Workers Union (AWU); Paul Howes, national 
secretary of the AWU; and Mark Arbib, Senator and employment minister (Wanna 2010). In 
addition two Senators, David Feeney, assistant national secretary of the ALP, and Don Farrell 
were involved. These individuals cut across the left and right factions, although the motive 
was revitalising the party fortunes some had personal grievances with Rudd (according to 
Stuart 2010: 270). Shorten and Howes brought the influence of the wider Labor movement 
via the AWU. Howes was the first to call for Rudd to go, but he subsequently played down 
his actual influence on the ALP in his diaries (Howes 2010). Arbib, who had previously 
delivered the numbers for Rudd against Beazley, organised the powerful NSW right faction. 
Feeney did the same job in Victoria. Although Gillard was nominally aligned with the left, 
gaining her seat in Lalor with support from the Victorian left faction, Kent (2010) suggests 
this was more ‘organisational than ideological’. Gillard gained her political experience as 
Chief of Staff to John Brumby when he was Opposition leader in Victoria and she was a 
supporter of Mark Latham’s doomed ALP leadership. Both men were significant figures on 
the ALP’s right. Gillard it seems was beyond factional alignment, a pragmatic and 
opportunitistic politician, rather than an ideologically driven. Therefore the fact that these 
individuals were all from the right faction should not be so surprising. Rudd who had owed 
his position, at least initially, to some of the powerbrokers on the right (although the 
complexities of the December 2006 leadership contest, that put Rudd in place even though 
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Gillard had the numbers, meant there was not a clear left-right factional split in caucus) saw 
his support disappear. The reality of the situation became apparent on the eve of the challenge 
as he commented ‘It has become apparent to me in the course of the last period of time … 
that a number of factional leaders in the Labor party no longer support my leadership’ 
(Sydney Morning Herald, 23 June 2010). 
 
Gillard rebuffed approaches, but as it became obvious that Rudd was isolated and Gillard had 
the numbers she decided to stand (Gauja 2011: 11).  Surprisingly few MPs and journalists 
were aware of how developed the coup had become, with many senior players still in the dark 
(Stuart 2010). Although vowing to fight on, after takings soundings he realised he had little 
support in the caucus, one conservative estimate gave him no more that 20 of the 118 caucus 
votes in the party room and these were largely sympathy votes (Stuart 2010: 278). Rudd 
withdrew from the contest, allowing Gillard to be elected unopposed at the caucus meeting 
the following morning. 
 
In contrast to Rudd’s lack of solid numbers in caucus, Gillard had realised early on that 
maintaining a factional powerbase (appealing to both left and right factions) was crucial in 
the ‘gang warfare’ of ALP politics (Kent 2010; Davis 2011). Rudd failed to heed the lesson 
of Labor leaders; he led no faction within the party and owed his position to a broader 
constituency based on the opinion polls. He had not shaped the party around himself as 
Gough Whitlam had done. He was not steeped in the Labor party as a favourite son as with 
Bob Hawke and he had not battled to the top after a long internal struggle as had Paul 
Keating (Marr 2010). The lack of a stable and loyal powerbase in the party (as shown by his 
inability to develop sufficient numbers of supporters within the caucus) which, when added to 
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his centralising tendencies, combined to create a vulnerability to the Rudd leadership (Stuart 
2010). 
 
The Removal of Julia Gillard 
 
When the dust settled on Gillard’s three years as Labor leader and prime minister, the extent 
of the oppositional forces she had to battle with became apparent. From inside the party Rudd 
led a campaign to destabilise her and retained a degree of caucus support and wider electoral 
support, the Liberal-led opposition had regrouped around Abbott’s leadership and the forces 
of the press circled around Australia’s first female prime minister (Bennister 2013). After 
ousting Rudd in June 2010, Gillard called an early election for 21 August in an attempt to 
establish a stronger mandate, mindful of the manner of her taking office. The resultant 
minority Labor government supported by independents provided her with another 
monumental challenge. 
 
Gillard had more than managed to keep Labor afloat in parliament by astutely negotiating 
deals from her position as leader of a minority government, but failed to register with the 
electorate. Again the short electoral cycle fuelled leadership speculation as Rudd waited in 
the wings. Gillard had tried to accommodate him as Foreign Affairs Minister when she 
named her first ministry after the 2010 election. Rudd though, bitter at his removal, spent the 
time undermining Gillard. He stood down abruptly on 22 February 2012 on a trip to 
Washington, prompting Gillard to face him down five days later in a caucus vote. She won 71 
to 31, but despite Rudd’s assurances that he would not challenge again, his backbench 
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presence continued to haunt Gillard. Her personal leadership ratings and those of the 
government continued to flat line. In almost a mirror image of the Gillard challenge in 2010, 
Rudd seized the final opportunity before the parliamentary recess on 26 June 2013. 
Conscious of the likely drubbing in the election, 26 Labor MPs switched sides to give Rudd a 
57 to 45 advantage (of all the ‘spills’ this proved to be his highest number of caucus 
supporters Rudd could muster). The crucial factor proved the transfer of Bill Shorten, 
factional leader and former head of the AWU to Rudd. Shorten, had been a prominent Gillard 
supporter and put his own future leadership ambitions at risk by jumping across to the Rudd 
camp. 
 
There are multiple explanations and commentary on the reasons for the failure of Gillard’s 
tenure as prime minister. Prominent factors include the inability to shake off the impression 
of  ruthlessness in the way she obtained the premiership and her policy reversal after ruling 
out a Carbon Tax in 2010 then proceeding to introduce it. Many (such as Brett 2013 and 
Johnson 2013) also note her skilful management of a minority government and the piloting of 
several important pieces of legislation through parliament, in particular the Gonski education 
reforms and national disability insurance. The mechanics of the party meant Gillard was 
always in a perilous position having to battle on several fronts at once. As Strangio(2013) 
noted, her premiership was under a constant shadow: ‘Her entire prime ministership has 
dangled under a Sword of Damocles of leadership speculation. More has been said and 
written about when she will be dumped from office than about what she has done in office’. 
 
Closer analysis of how caucus turned against Gillard showed that it was not just Shorten’ s 
actions, but the loss of the NSW right faction that previously turned against Rudd to install 
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Gillard in 2010. Bob Carr, the former NSW Premier who had been made Foreign Affairs 
Minister under Gillard succeeding Rudd, abandoned her soon after professing loyalty. NSW 
MPs deserted her almost on mass, fearing wipe out in the election. Polling in Paul Keating’s 
former constituency of Blaxland in NSW suggested even a 12 per cent lead was under threat 
(Canberra Times 28 June 2013). Panicked MPs grabbed the chance to jump ship and return to 
the disliked, but potentially damage-limiting Rudd. In the event, Rudd’s second go at the 
premiership lasted only a few months and amounted to a survival exercise. His return may 
have prevented an ALP meltdown, but the loss of 20 seats did not amount to a triumphant 
return. Rudd stepped down from the leadership and, although he initially remained in 
parliament, formally announced his retirement as MP for Griffith on 22 November 2013. 
 
Understanding Ease of Removal: Party Institutions, Culture and Circumstances 
 
The explanation for the removals of Rudd and Gillard and the non removal of Brown can be 
understood by comparing the respective party institutions; party cultures; and political 
circumstances. That is to say it is more than just the institutional arrangements that define the 
leadership succession as Weller has implied. Rather procedures operate in conjunction with 
the cultural norms which shape the respective parties, as well as circumstances that determine 
how easy it is to remove incumbents.   
 
In the case of Brown it is clear that the Electoral College constitutes a protective shield for 
incumbent Labour Party leaders, and that protection is even more pronounced when in office 
as the principle of initiating a contest requires the approval of party conference (Quinn 2005: 
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809). Thus Weller is justified in noting that incumbents benefit from strong procedural 
obstacles that enhance their security of tenure as there are considerable disincentives for 
challengers (Quinn 2012: 82-94).  
 
In order for a challenger to proceed to the Electoral College they need to secure the backing 
of 20 per cent (or 71) of Labour MPs, which was a high threshold for a challenger to pass 
(Dorey and Denham 2011: 289). What also impedes challengers is the way in which the 
Electoral College works. Its procedural inflexibility means that a prospective challenger has a 
series of costs that may put them off initiating their challenge. These costs can be defined as 
decision costs; financial costs; and disunity costs. Decision costs mean shifting the focus 
away from policy implementation and effective governing, alongside critiquing the 
opposition, as the party turns in on itself. Financial costs reflect the varying burdens that can 
be imposed upon the party depending on the selection procedures that they utilise. Disunity 
costs reflect the risks associated with rival candidates condemning their respective policy 
positions. With the rules permitting prolonged periods for electioneering, and the time for 
formal balloting to be conducted, the consequence is political paralysis for the party if they 
attempt to use the Electoral College (as intended) whilst in office (Quinn 2005: 795-6).   
 
Given those constraints potential challengers (and their supporters) had to ask themselves the 
following question. Is it viable for a governing party, on the brink of facing the electorate in 
the midst of an economic recession to set aside around four months for an expensive 
leadership challenge, which by its very nature will set Labour elites and factional blocks 
against each other?  (Quinn 2005: 799-801). With the costs of mobilising a challenge so high 
the PLP became trapped in a ‘vicious circle’. The government would be undermined by an 
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event led to further questioning of Brown’s competence, whereupon Labour MPs ‘would be 
rumoured to be mobilising an attempt to unseat him; and then they would hit the brick wall of 
the procedures which make it so difficult to unseat the incumbent’ (Heppell 2010: 193).  
 
There were also wider risks for potential challengers such as Miliband. These involved risks 
for them personally, but also a calculation of the risks for their assumed supporters. This 
reflects the strategic choices that they would have as prime ministerial aspirants. ‘Serious’ 
candidates for the succession, who wanted to succeed Brown as an alternative leader had to 
challenge him directly (Weller 2012: 153). The in it from the start rules (IFTS) meant that 
they could not use a backbench or alternative front bench stalking horse candidate to 
challenge Brown. This option, in which the alternative challenger wounds Brown to such an 
extent that he stands down creating a vacancy, whereupon the leading candidate enters, was 
not available. The necessity of having to challenge directly incurs increased risk, but not just 
for the candidate themselves. A potential alternative would presumably have a ‘court’ of 
parliamentary backers and they also have to calculate the cost-benefit analysis for themselves 
personally, in terms of their careers. To initiate a contest the challenger would need to acquire 
the backing of 71out of 363 Labour MPs. If the challenger resigned from Cabinet themselves 
they would find it difficult to persuade those occupying ministerial office (approaching 100 
Labour MPs were ministers in the Brown government) to resign in order to sign nomination 
papers backing the challenge. Their fear would be Brown might survive meaning that their 
disloyalty to Brown would be punished. Not only would a speedy return to ministerial office 
be blocked, but they had to factor in the way in which Brown dealt with disloyalty – i.e. his 
reputation of negative briefing against his rivals and critics (Quinn 2012: 91).  
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Risk, fear of defeat, and fear of the consequences of defeat, undoubtedly deterred possible 
serious candidates. However, there were particular and distinct circumstances at play in the 
2008-2010 period that made the removal of Brown harder to engineer, than say the removal 
of Blair in the 2005-2007 period. Brown’s survival was also a by-product of there being no 
clear consensus on who was best positioned to defeat Brown, and then win the forthcoming 
election. Whilst some advocated Alan Johnson as an alternative, and Straw and Harman were 
said to be positioning themselves, the most openly ambitious Cabinet heavyweight was David 
Miliband. The fact that opinion polling evidence suggested that Labour would be only 
marginally better positioned for retaining power if he replaced Brown, created doubts 
amongst potential backers. Despite the risks and costs identified above it might be 
worthwhile if there was clear evidence that David Miliband could retain power for the party, 
but overwhelming evidence of this was not forthcoming. Miliband had to calculate not only 
whether he could defeat Brown, but whether he could defeat Cameron. Regardless was it best 
to experience a brief tenure in Downing Street, between defeating Brown and losing to 
Cameron, potentially tainting the Blairite brand? As his younger brother reportedly told him 
(at the height of the June 2009 speculation), the leadership was his anyway after Brown, 
whether in office or opposition (Hasan and MacIntyre 2011: 187).  
 
Before considering how the survival of Brown compares to the removal of Rudd and Gillard, 
it is worth considering how the position of Miliband in the 2008 to 2010 period compares to 
that of Brown prior to 2007. The above analysis suggests that the removing of an incumbent 
Labour Party leader is immensely difficult due to the procedural obstacles that characterise 
the nomination processes and the functioning of the Electoral College. However, McAnulla 
develops an argument that seems to challenge this assumption, by arguing that Blair had been 
‘compelled to leave office earlier than intended following internal party pressure’ (McAnulla 
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2010: 593). The circumstances that Brown faced as the leading alternative to Blair prior to 
2007; and those faced by Miliband (and Johnson, Straw and Harman) were different and 
reflected the importance of circumstances. Brown was unwilling to formally challenge Blair, 
but Blair had publicly declared in 2004 that he would not seek to lead the Labour Party into a 
fourth term. He did, however, stipulate his intention to serve a full third term, implying the 
leadership transition would be scheduled for around 2009. Whilst considerably later than 
what Brown wanted, (and expected according to the infamous and unclear Blair-Brown deal 
of 1994, which he felt stipulated the mid-point of the second term), acknowledging his 
intention to stand down provided Brown with an opportunity. As the authority of Blair drifted 
away, Brown applied informal pressure upon him to set a timetable for his departure. The 
September 2006 coup initiated by supporters of Brown forced Blair into naming his departure 
date, after a series of co-ordinated ministerial resignations (and threats of more) unless Blair 
agreed to depart (Rawnsley 2010: 402-3).  
 
It was because Blair had pre-announced his intention to depart (that made the question was 
when, not if), which meant that informal pressures made more impact in the 2005 to 2007 
period for Brown. The likelihood of it succeeding was aided by the fact that it was early in 
the Parliament, whereas later on the Parliament plotters had overcome the fear that selecting 
two unelected prime ministers within one Parliament might not be acceptable to the electorate 
(Quinn 2012: 90). And therein was the central question about the direction of the post-Blair 
Labour Party, as the debate about whether, how and when to remove Brown stemmed from 
the circumstances of his accession to the party leadership. As Kenny argues the nature of the 
Blair-Brown feud, both ‘towering figures’ with ‘destructive entourages’ would ‘leave 
precious little space for other possible successors to emerge’ (Kenny 2009b: 666). However, 
the nature of the transition from Blair to Brown suggests that there are more than two ways to 
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see Labour party leadership disputes. First, there are forced exits triggered through the formal 
procedures; second, there are attempts to force an exit by informal pressures which are 
ignored by the incumbent; and third, there are forced exits triggered by internal pressures but 
activated outside the formal procedures. As Cross and Blais suggest the third scenario of 
‘resigned under pressure’ best describes the departure of Blair, whereas the second scenario 
best describes the experience of Brown (Cross and Blais 2012).  
 
The end for Rudd’s leadership of the party in 2010 and Gillard’s in 2013 was swift and 
brutal. As with Bob Hawke before him [in 1991], Rudd had to endure a hastily arranged press 
conference gathering his family around him to shed the tears of an ousted prime minister on 
live television. Gillard gave a dignified and measured performance, but also close to tears 
hoped she had ‘made it easier for the next female prime minister’. The simplistic analysis is 
that Rudd and Gillard were removed because the Labor party could. Australian party politics 
had managed to resist the trend towards expanding leadership selection beyond the 
parliamentary party to the membership (Cross and Blais 2010; Kenig 2009). With only the 
minor parties in Australia expanding the leadership selectorate, there was an absence of any 
contagion effect. Party officials interviewed by Cross and Blais cite the short three year 
electoral cycle as the most common reason for maintaining the status quo. The main parties 
were reluctant to indulge in extended leadership selection and be ‘leaderless’. Therefore 
power to select the party leader remained firmly in the hands of the parliamentary caucus, 
containing elected members from both the House of Representative and the Senate. The 
concentration of elite power exacerbated the role of factions within the ALP. Former party 
leader Mark Latham called Labor a ‘virtual party controlled by a handful of machine men’ 
(2005: 186). The ALP’s factions are not only more entrenched than any other Australian 
party, but arguably any other social democratic party in the Western world (Leigh 2000: 427; 
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Warhurst and Parkin 2000; Boucek 2009). Factions have a formal presence at all levels of 
party politics; they hold regular meetings, elect office-bearers, produce newsletters and often 
policy papers (Leigh 2000). 
 
Yet the machine extends beyond the caucus to extra-parliamentary powerbrokers to the 
‘faceless men’ and other key actors.. In the wake of Paul Keating’s defeat the centre left 
faded (largely through a combination of retirements, defeat, and shift of the remaining to 
become unaligned) and although the right is the dominant faction, the party is largely 
polarised between two core factional groups of left and right (Gauja 2011). Rudd used the 
right faction to gain the leadership, but one of his many errors was not cultivating this support 
in the party room. Factionalism only became entrenched in the ALP when a more 
orchestrated system emerged to allocate party positions in the 1980s. John Howard was adept 
at working the Liberal party room to neuter his challenger Peter Costello, ruthless in 
removing his opponents and assiduous in cultivating his supporters (Bennister 2008, 2012). 
Rudd’s relationship with the powerbrokers in the Labor party was key to understanding his 
rise to the top, his demise and then return. With such a small caucus and party room, a prime 
minister who wishes to survive needs to put in the hard yards in Canberra. Rudd’s efforts to 
override ‘the machine’ were bound to come unstuck. When elected as prime minister, Rudd 
broke with tradition (and parliamentary party rules) in announcing that he would not be 
consulting with factional leaders when appointing his first Cabinet (Gauja 2011; Strangio et 
al 2013). Initially this was interpreted as an indication of the decline of factional power in the 
party, but closer investigation shows that it made little difference, faction leaders were 
consulted and as ever a leader needs to balance state and factional interests (Kefford 2013: 
139). Leigh predicted in 2000 that factionalism in the ALP, largely driven by ideological 
bases now no longer as relevant, had reached its zenith. Cavalier (2005, 2012) though points 
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to factions as ‘executive placement agencies’, having succeeded in capturing the ALP 
organisation whereby a small political class dominated decision-making, increasingly 
discontented from the Australian public. 
 
The Rudd-Gillard battle demonstrated that factions still maintained a hold on the upper 
echelons of the ALP and the operational mechanisms of an increasingly dysfunctional party. 
Although policy differences were minimal between the two, the consequences of losing 
factional support were considerable. Gillard who owed her position to the factions (coming 
from the left, but supported in her challenge to Rudd by the right) understood this dynamic 
better than Rudd. Conscious of how the public tends to be most aware of the ALP’s factional 
politics during such leadership disputes (Economou 2010), she realised she needed to 
legitimise her leadership early on by calling an election. Gillard could not see off Rudd 
during her three years as prime minister nor counter the notion that she had ruthlessly ousted 
her predecessor. Much as Brown had posed a constant threat to Blair, so Rudd undermined 
and destabilised the Gillard minority government. Brown though had been inside the tent, 
Rudd after the 2012 failed challenge was outside the government, acting more like Keating, 
sitting on the backbench carping and plotting against Hawke. 
 
A simple structural analysis would present the return to Rudd as an acceptance by caucus that 
they got in wrong in elevating Gillard in 2010 and seized the opportunity to return to the 
Rudd project. Such analyses expose the dysfunction evident in the ALP: ‘There are few 
checks and balances within the party itself; with whom do these caucus members actually 
consult before deciding whom they’ll support in a leadership ballot? A few faction bosses, 
perhaps a union official here and there; but let’s not confuse such methods with democracy’ 
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(Bongiorno 2013a). The context of the Gillard premiership does though need to be 
considered. Having seen off the Rudd challenge in February 2012, her position should have 
been strengthened. However Gillard lurched from scandal to scandal involving the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives (Peter Slipper), then former MP Craig Thomson misuse of 
union funds (Wanna 2013). Both cases had unfortunate sexual aspects. Gillard came out 
fighting in Parliament on 9 October 2012 with a stirring attack on Tony Abbott’s misogyny 
(footage of which went viral). Gillard, as Australia’s first female prime minister faced a set of 
unique circumstances that impacted on her leadership and played a considerable part in the 
framing of her period of office and ultimate removal. Prior to 2010, Gillard had been subject 
to sexist attacks regarding her childlessness and marital status, but once she became prime 
minister the intensity and vitriolic nature of the abuse rose considerably (Sawer 2013). The 
sexual vilification of Gillard fed into the framing of her as a ‘liar’ (for her broken campaign 
promises) and ‘traitor’ (for the way she ousted Rudd). She was judged by different standards 
from her male counterparts (Sawer 2013; Summers 2012). Gillard’s admirable effort to 
counter the media and opposition narrative in parliament gave her a slight personal rating 
bounce and bought her some time. She sought to capitalise with a surprise announcement at 
the end of January that the next election would be on 14 September 2013. In a move designed 
to end speculation of her leadership and place the party on an early election footing, she had 
hoped to remove uncertainty from her tenure. It had the opposite effect as it presented Rudd 
with a timetable to mobilise against her. 
 
Rudd moved swiftly on resuming the premiership (he saw the Gillard period as an 
unfortunate aberration), in contrast to Gillard’s early election announcement in 2010, Rudd 
announced a package of party reforms. Party change in Australia had always bucked the trend 
identified in the literature, whereby factional conflict is temporarily suspended when a party 
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achieves vote success (Budge et al 2010). The Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (FPLP) 
standing orders stated that all members of the caucus were eligible to vote in the leadership 
election with the winning candidate determined by a run-off ballot (Gauja 2011). Rudd 
sought to change this on reassuming the leadership. Central to the reform package, and in the 
hope of capitalising on his new found caucus support, he pushed through a change to the 
leadership selection rules. The proposals to widen the electorate for leadership ballots to the 
party membership giving equal weight with the caucus required a formal rule change at a 
special parliamentary caucus meeting on 21 July 2013. In contrast to the Electoral College in 
the British Labour party, the unions were not part of the new franchise (Gauja 2013). 
Proposals to reform the election of party leaders were not new; in fact Rudd floated the idea 
in 2011. As noted, Australia has appeared out of step with most other liberal democratic 
parties in concentrating the election in the hands of a small parliamentary caucus. However 
the appearance of a sudden democratic conversion should be tempered with a political reality 
check (Gauja 2013; Manwaring 2013a; Quiggan 2013). Rudd drew his strength from the 
party membership and by presenting reform early in his second go as party leader (with his 
political capital momentarily high again) forced through the issue to make sure that his 
personal position was bolstered. Rudd also set a high threshold at 75 per cent of the caucus 
required to remove an incumbent leader between elections (though this was swiftly reduced 
to 60 per cent by caucus). Rudd had perhaps hoped to entrench his own position as leader, by 
effectively creating a fixed term leadership, protected from intermittent caucus challenges. In 
the event the ALP election defeat in September 2013 saw Rudd step down as leader. Bill 
Shorten became the first ALP leader to benefit from the selection changes, defeating Antony 
Albanese on 13 October 2013. Shorten won with 64 per cent of the caucus vote and 40 per 
cent of the party membership vote giving him an overall weighted vote of 52 per cent (Sydney 
Morning Herald 13 October 2013). Ironically it was the caucus vote that secured the 
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leadership for Shorten, The new rules, though introduced hastily (party members ended up 
paying for it), appeared to discourage any factional strife and initially at least presented a 
more united party (Bongiorno 2013b; Manwaring 2013b). 
 
The political culture of party leadership in Australia has always been ‘brutal’. A ‘spill’ could 
be organised at short notice and defenestration was swift and ruthless. Though more common 
in Opposition than government it has been a powerful feature of party politics. Davis (1998: 
172) observed that ‘beyond doubt, party leadership in Australia operates on a Darwinian scale 
unmatched elsewhere in the Western parliamentary democracies.’ The oligarchic nature of 
party organisation ensures that party leaders need to satisfy, placate, manipulate or cajole 
their peers to survive in post (Bynander and ‘t Hart 2007). As Rudd and Gillard found out, 
once leadership speculation gets going in Canberra a cocktail of party power brokers and 
political journalists can easily destabilise an incumbent prime minister. A devastating critique 
of Rudd by journalist David Marr (2010) represented a tipping point in Rudd’s fortunes for 
the public, meanwhile concerted internal party opposition was mobilising (Evans 2010: 261). 
Although Rudd’s micro management tendencies, short temper and indecision were known, 
Marr put a damaging perception of Rudd into the public domain. Once such speculation is set 
in motion it becomes a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, as leadership consolidation is an elusive 
commodity in Australian politics (Bynander and ‘t Hart 2007). Rudd and Gillard in common 
with many of their predecessors had to deal with interpersonal conflict and rivalry at the heart 
of the party. Factional politics meant he had no choice but to work with and through his 
Deputy, who clearly coveted his position. Challengers regroup and fight again as Keating did 
in 1991, but also leaders can hang around to fight to regain the crown as Howard did 
successfully and Peacock unsuccessfully in the Liberal party. Beazley had two spells as ALP 
leader and so Rudd’s return was not so unusual. The vanquished in Australian politics are 
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reluctant to leave the stage, desperately clinging on to power (Weller 2012). Keating summed 
it up in characteristic forthright style ‘You know, prime ministers have got Araldite on their 
pants, most of them. They want to stick to their seat. And you either put a sword through 
them or let the people do it’ (Bennister 2012: 128; Brett 2007: 24). The parliamentary caucus 
dynamic and machine politics create an Australian leadership setting in which ‘hypocrisy, 
deceit and plotting are endemic’ (Bynander and ‘t Hart 2007). The widening of the leadership 
selectorate is unlikely to remove this abrasive political culture- after all factions still control 
pre-selections and national conference - with such a ruthless ‘coup culture’ ingrained at state 
as well as federal level (Bryant 2013). Yet the ALP may have set in train a party reform that 
will provide a level of stability all leaders crave. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article challenges the assumptions that the likely success of leadership evictions are 
solely determined by the leadership procedures that parties adopt. Noting the significance of 
circumstances and party cultures, we advance two scenarios through which eviction attempts 
can be understood: first, forced exits triggered through the activation of formal procedures 
(Rudd and Gillard); second, attempts to force an exit by informal pressures outside of the 
formal procedures which are overcome by the incumbent (Brown). 
 
The article has highlighted several similarities in the case studies. Brown and Rudd were 
complex characters unsuited to the demands of prime ministerial leadership. Their leadership 
styles were fatally flawed, leading to policy failure, indecision and internal rancour. Brown 
and Rudd had coveted the position and took power with high expectations, in Brown’s case 
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as an antidote to Blair, in Rudd’s case after 11 years out of office. Gillard seized the reins to 
oust a dysfunctional leader and then faced the challenge of leading a minority government 
and a hostile media, unprepared and unwilling to accept a female prime minister. The ALP 
resolutely maintained a factional system, accompanied by strict party discipline, which 
concentrated leadership selection in the parliamentary caucus. The concentration of power in 
such a small elite of powerbrokers has made party leaders in Australia particularly vulnerable 
to challenge. Gillard struggled to shake off the impact of her usurpation of the crown and 
successfully counter the personal attacks on her. Rudd, mindful of the negative aspect of such 
leadership strife, placed the ALP on a path to wider and potentially more stable form of party 
leadership. Brown was fortunate that institutional rules in the UK have entrenched party 
leaders in place, creating greater obstacles for potential rivals. The Shorten election in 2013 
may now see the ALP leader similarly entrenched and pressure is sure to mount for the 
Liberal party to follow the ALP in widening the leadership franchise. 
 
Yet as the cases show, the likely success of leadership evictions will depend on a series of 
more complex factors. Informal pressures have a powerful influence, driven by party culture 
and context. Indeed as Walter (2013: 50) noted ‘Prime ministerial performance is always 
conditional – depending on the fortunes of the historical moment, the political culture with 
which a prime minister must engage and the institutional vicissitudes with which he or she is 
confronted.’ A cocktail of policy failure, command leadership and a dramatic slump in the 
polls drove the informal pressure against Rudd. Policy U-turns and increasing poll pressure 
counted against Gillard. A combination of media driven deconstruction of leadership and 
internal party angst and electoral anxiety sparked the ‘spills’. All three party leaders faced 
concentrated media framing of their personality, in Gillard’s case the political circumstance 
of having to manage a minority government and contend with a level of vicious misogyny put 
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additional and perhaps unique pressure on her leadership. A creditable, alternative candidate 
does though need to be available and willing to stand as the incumbent struggles along. In 
Brown’s case, the risks for potential challengers were substantially greater and there was no 
consensus around which candidate was best placed to replace him. 
 
The immediacy of an Australian leadership ‘spill’, prior to the Rudd reforms, gave the 
challengers a great advantage over the drawn out and formalised electoral campaign in the 
Labour party. However while such formal constraints may represent an obvious explanation 
for greater leadership turnover in Australia, both the prevailing party culture and political 
circumstances play an important role in driving the success of leadership ejection. 
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